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In the past few months, two California decisions have made strong statements to lawyers about improper behavior in handling real es-tate matters for their clients. One such case is concerned with going 
into business with a client while representing the client and the other 
case addresses supporting the other side after the termination of the cli-
ent’s representation.
Fair v. Bakhtiari
In the first of these cases, Fair v. Bakhtiari, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 765 (Ct. App. 
2011), a lawyer who had represented a client for about six months then 
went into business with him. The two of them made real estate invest-
ments together and shared the profits; the client provided the money 
and the lawyer negotiated and drafted documents. Their enterprise 
lasted about 10 years (although the lawyer continued to practice at a 
law firm for the first four years of their joint venture) and ended badly 
when the client terminated their business relationship. The lawyer filed 
suit against the client for the value of the lawyer’s interest in their jointly 
owned businesses and for other claims, including assault and battery, 
and the client cross-complained for, among other things, breach of 
fiduciary duty. After a bifurcated trial, the court found that the lawyer 
had violated two California standards. One was California Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3-300, which, like ABA Model Rule 1.8(a), requires 
that a lawyer—before entering into a business transaction with a cli-
ent—advise the client in writing and give the client the opportunity to 
get advice from independent counsel on the situation. The second was 
the statutory presumption, found in Cal. Prob. Code § 16004, that the 
lawyer (or other fiduciary) that enters into a transaction with a client (or 
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    beneficiary) has the burden of proving 
that the transaction was fair and rea-
sonable to the client. The lawyer failed 
to overcome this burden, although the 
investment venture was very profit-
able. In light of those findings, the trial 
court rejected the lawyer’s request to 
amend his complaint to seek a mon-
etary recovery from the client and the 
businesses on a quantum meruit basis 
for all the services the lawyer had per-
formed during their shared career (over 
and above what he had already taken 
out of the venture as compensation, 
profit sharing, and benefits). The appel-
late opinion affirmed that conclusion, 
holding that the lawyer’s misconduct 
disqualified him from demanding any 
further compensation from the client.
Does this decision mean that a 
lawyer cannot invest in a business 
deal with his or her real estate client? 
No, but the decision is a cautionary 
tale about the civil consequences for 
a lawyer who gets the rules wrong. 
Because this lawyer failed to meet his 
burden of showing that the transactions 
with clients were fair and reasonable to 
the clients, the lawyer lost his owner-
ship interest in the businesses (a series 
of real estate investments in which the 
lawyer was a partner), despite the law-
yer’s years of work as an active partner 
in the businesses. He was permitted 
to retain all of his prior compensation 
(which the former clients did not seek 
to recover), but he was denied the right 
to obtain quantum meruit compensa-
tion for the services he had provided to 
the investment entities.
Is this a standard peculiar to 
California? The rule now stated in Cal. 
Prob. Code § 16004 has long been part 
of California statutory law, but it is 
based on common law considerations 
that exist even where there is no such 
codification. For example, the Indiana 
Supreme Court has stated that “Indiana 
case law recognizes that transactions 
entered into during the existence of a fi-
duciary relationship are presumptively 
invalid as the product of undue influ-
ence. Transactions between a lawyer 
and client are presumed to be fraudu-
lent, so that the lawyer has the burden 
of proving the fairness and honesty 
thereof.” In re Smith, 572 N.E.2d 1280, 
1285 (Ind. 1991), cited with approval 
in Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178, 184 
(Ind. 2007). See also In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against McMullen, 896 P.2d 
1281, 1290 (Wash. 1995); Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 126.
Suppose the lawyer does not 
invest funds in the client’s project but 
instead agrees to take a piece of the ac-
tion in lieu of fees for doing the legal 
work? It is widely recognized that the 
business transaction rules do not apply 
for either civil or disciplinary purposes 
when a client hires a lawyer under a 
traditional hourly, flat, contingency, or 
mixed fee arrangement. But a lawyer’s 
fee agreement is subject to the busi-
ness transaction rules when the lawyer 
obtains an ownership, possessory, or 
security interest adverse to the client. 
One example of the rules is the law-
yer’s obtaining an ownership interest 
in the client’s company or in a client’s 
asset as compensation for legal services. 
This example is explicit in Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 126, Reporter’s Note, cmt. a, 
which cites several published appellate 
opinions to that effect. The same con-
clusion has been reached in a number 
of advisory ethics opinions, including 
ABA Formal Op. 00-418 (July 7, 2000). 
The Fair decision does not rely on any 
distinction between investing with a cli-
ent and obtaining an ownership interest 
in return for providing legal services.
Will the Lawyer Always 
Go Unpaid?
Can a lawyer who goes into busi-
ness with a client obtain compensa-
tion for services provided to the client 
or to the client’s business entity? The 
opinion in Fair provides a starting point 
for an answer in California. The issue 
on appeal was whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying the 
lawyer’s motion to amend its complaint 
to add a claim for the reasonable value 
of his services. Fair, however, does 
not provide a definite answer to other 
factual situations that might be raised 
in later cases. In Fair, the appellate 
court found that under the aggravated 
factual circumstances presented, the 
trial court had not abused its discretion 
in denying the motion to amend. 
Among other things, the lawyer failed 
to document many of the transactions 
he sought to enforce; the parties had 
disagreed over time about the terms of 
their deal. In addition, the lawyer failed 
to provide any advice to his clients 
regarding the transactions despite the 
continued existence of a lawyer-client 
relationship; and the lawyer had unre-
solved conflicts. One conflict was that 
the lawyer represented multiple clients 
(including the individual client and nu-
merous business entities), and another 
stemmed from the lawyer’s financial 
interest in the transactions on which 
he provided legal services. The law-
yer failed to comply with the conflict 
disclosure and consent requirements 
of California’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct for both sets of conflicts. It is 
possible that a lawyer might succeed in 
obtaining compensation in less extreme 
settings, even if the lawyer fails to meet 
the burden of showing that the transac-
tions were fair, reasonable, and fully 
explained to the client. Still, a lawyer 
seeking quantum meruit compensation 
will have an uphill battle. The reason 
is that the court refused to apply the 
doctrine of severance (a common law 
principle, codified in Cal. Civ. Code  
§ 1599, that permits a court to sever the 
invalid part of a contract and enforce 
the portions that are valid), and ac-
cordingly the lawyer’s failure to prove 
that the transactions were fair, reason-
able, and fully explained, permitted 
the clients to void the transactions 
in their entirety. The trial court’s key 
finding was that all of the lawyer’s 
services were “part and parcel of those 
unenforceable business transactions.” 
Fair, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 783. There 
might be other situations, however, in 
which a court would permit a client 
to void a transaction but nevertheless 
see at least some of the lawyer’s legal 
or nonlegal services as distinguishable 
from the void transaction and there-
fore compensable.
Is the client’s right to void the en-
tire transaction peculiar to California, 
or will lawyers in other jurisdictions 
face the same potential outcome? The 
client’s right to void the entire transac-
tion comes from the common law and 
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                  is not unique to California. See, e.g., 
DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc., 
755 A.2d 757, 770–71 (R.I. 2000); Tyson 
v. Moore, 613 So. 2d 817, 823–24 (Miss. 
1992); and Security Federal Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n of Nashville v. Riviera, Ltd., 856 
S.W.2d 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). This 
right of avoidance can be seen as an 
expression of the norms that a fiduciary 
ordinarily may not retain any of the 
profits that arise from a breach of fidu-
ciary duty and that an agent may be 
required to deliver to the principal any 
benefit acquired through the misuse of 
the agent’s position. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 874, cmt. b (1979); 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.02, 
cmt. e (2006); and Note, Sanctions for 
Attorney’s Representation of Conflicting 
Interests, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 994, 1004–06 
(1957).
 Will lawyers outside of California 
face the same problem in attempting 
to obtain compensation for services 
when a transaction is held to be void? 
The authors are not aware of any case 
from outside California that directly 
addresses whether a lawyer can secure 
compensation for services to a joint 
business with a client when the lawyer 
cannot otherwise enforce a related 
transaction. The court in Fair viewed 
the issues from a contract standpoint, 
but other starting points might be 
used by different courts. The issue 
might be viewed from the standpoint 
of agency, fiduciary duty, or lawyer’s 
conflict of interest.
Is there any way for a lawyer to 
safely go into business with a client 
and enforce the compensation fea-
tures of the deal? The safest course is 
for the lawyer to comply fully with the 
business transaction rule (Rule 3-300 
in California and Rule 1.8(a) under the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct). 
Doing so should allow the lawyer to 
meet the burden of proving that the 
transaction was fair and reasonable 
to the client. Compliance means that 
(1) the agreement between the lawyer 
and client is fully stated in writing in a 
form that the client reasonably should 
be able to understand, (2) the lawyer 
advises the client in writing to seek 
independent counsel and gives the 
client time to seek that advice, (3) the 
client agrees to the deal in writing, and 
(4) the lawyer provides the client all the 
advice the lawyer would have given if 
not a party to the deal. The obligation 
to competently advise the client about 
the transaction long has been part of 
California law and received its most fa-
mous statement in Felton v. Le Breton, 28 
P. 490, 493–94 (Cal. 1892). Accord In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against McMul-
len, 896 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Wash. 1995).
The difficulty of complying with the 
business transaction rule depends on 
the nature of the transaction. Imagine, 
as an example, that a lawyer wants to 
buy a client’s used car for the use of 
the lawyer’s teenager. It would not be 
complicated for the lawyer to satisfy 
all of the requirements of the appli-
cable business transaction rule in an 
isolated transaction of that sort. The 
documentation would be simple and 
the fair value of the used car easy to 
determine. The transaction in Fair was 
at the opposite end of the spectrum. 
There, the lawyer and the client entered 
into a real estate investment business. 
Rather than a simple, isolated transac-
tion, the lawyer and the client entered 
into a series of complex and interrelated 
business transactions with one another 
for which they formed a series of enti-
ties over time. In practice the buying, 
financing, operating, and selling of real 
estate breaks down into a great number 
of individual but interrelated transac-
tions. When the lawyer and client work 
side by side, day after day, in an active 
real estate investment or development 
program, a requirement that the lawyer 
comply with the business transaction 
rule for each new contract or contract 
modification would place an extraordi-
nary compliance burden on the lawyer.
Quitting as Counsel First?
Could the lawyer avoid the busi-
ness transaction requirements by 
terminating the lawyer-client rela-
tionship before entering into the 
joint venture? Although worthy of 
consideration, this solution has practi-
cal problems. The lawyer might have 
been invited into the real estate project 
precisely because the lawyer would 
contribute legal services, as was the 
case in Fair. The client testified that he 
agreed to give the lawyer a 30% ownership 
interest because the lawyer contributed his 
legal expertise, and the lawyer was found 
to have represented both the business enti-
ties and the individual client after that time.
It would be a significant protective step 
for the lawyer to clearly and unambiguous-
ly terminate the lawyer-client relationship 
before entering into any business transac-
tion with a client and then to carefully 
avoid any conduct that the former client 
reasonably might understand to mean that 
the lawyer-client relationship had been re-
established. By itself, however, termination 
does not provide the lawyer with immu-
nity. Although the business transaction rule 
by its terms applies to business transactions 
“with a client,” case law in California has 
applied this rule to situations in which 
the relationship of trust and confidence 
has continued after the termination of the 
lawyer-client relationship. The continuance 
of the relationship of trust and confidence 
is more likely when the business transac-
tion is related to the subject of the former 
relationship or involves information that 
the lawyer obtained as a result of the for-
mer representation. There is some similar 
authority on this point from outside Cali-
fornia. The application of ABA Model Rule 
1.8(a) to transactions with former clients is 
explicit in the Connecticut version of the 
rule, and the same result might be obtained 
through trust concepts. See Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 170, cmt. g.
Obtaining “Independent Approval”
Can the lawyer in the lawyer-client 
venture recommend the name of a pro-
spective second lawyer to satisfy the inde-
pendent approval requirement; would the 
second lawyer have to be in a different 
law firm; and who pays the fees of the 
second lawyer? Cal. Rule 3-300 and Model 
Rule 1.8(a) require the lawyer in the law-
yer–client venture to recommend that the 
client seek independent advice and to give 
the client time to obtain that advice. In a 
situation of any complexity or magnitude, 
such as in Fair, it would be prudent for 
the lawyer to refuse to proceed unless the 
client actually obtains independent legal 
advice. Model Rule 1.8(a) and Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 126 do not address the factors that make a 
lawyer “independent.” 
Common sense would dictate that the 
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    second lawyer not be in the same law 
firm with, or be paid by, the first lawyer 
and should not have a close personal 
or professional relationship with the 
first lawyer that might cause indepen-
dence to be questioned. It is probably 
best if the client selects the independent 
lawyer without any input from the first 
lawyer, but this practice is not required. 
California’s proposed new Rules of 
Professional Conduct (on which the su-
preme court has not yet ruled) have the 
following explanation: “An indepen-
dent lawyer is a lawyer who (i) does 
not have a financial interest in the trans-
action or acquisition, (ii) does not have 
a close legal, business, financial, profes-
sional or personal relationship with the 
lawyer seeking the client’s consent, and 
(iii) represents the client with respect to 
the transaction or acquisition.” Cali-
fornia State Bar, Petition Request That 
the State Bar of California Approve New 
California Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 1.8.8, cmt. 13, http://ethics.calbar.
ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=sOY6
VmyQx7s%3d&tabid=2669 (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2011).
The lawyer proposing to go into 
business with the client certainly may 
provide the client with the names of 
other lawyers to provide needed advice 
about the proposed transaction, but the 
original lawyer should not even appear 
to have selected the second lawyer. 
The role of independent counsel is 
to provide competent and unbiased 
advice to the client about the proposed 
transaction. For the second lawyer to 
counsel the client about the pros and 
cons of the proposed transaction and 
the reasonably available alternatives 
and their pros and cons, the second 
lawyer will likely want to discuss the 
situation with the first lawyer to better 
understand the genesis of the nature 
and form of the proposed transaction. It 
also is possible that this discussion will 
lead to negotiations between the two 
lawyers about the substance or form of 
the transaction.
Should the original lawyer consult 
with an ethics expert about the pro-
posed deal? The business transaction 
rules set out protocols that any lawyer 
should be able to follow. The greater 
problem is that the lawyer might not 
recognize the need to comply with the 
rule. Some lawyers may be unable to 
recognize that they need to comply 
with the business transaction rule, 
when their own commercial interests 
are at risk, though this requirement 
would have been apparent if they were 
advising or observing the conduct of 
another lawyer.
Further Obligations?
If a business agreement is ultimate-
ly approved by independent counsel, 
is the original lawyer subject to any 
ongoing further restraints because of 
his former status? The answer depends 
on the nature of the transaction. If the 
lawyer had purchased a used car from 
a client, it is difficult to see how there 
would be any later interaction between 
the lawyer and client about that trans-
action. When a lawyer is in business 
with a current client, however, the 
lawyer must be mindful of the business 
transactions requirements each time the 
lawyer and the client enter into a new or 
modified agreement with one another. 
The lawyer also must be certain that the 
business relationship and the lawyer’s 
financial interests do not affect the full 
performance of all of the lawyer’s du-
ties to the client and must comply with 
any other applicable conflict rules.
Is the relative sophistication of the 
lawyer and the client important in a 
business transactions situation? In de-
termining whether a business transac-
tion is fair and reasonable to the client 
and therefore is enforceable by the 
lawyer, there is a long case-law tradi-
tion of examining the client’s sophisti-
cation. The less sophisticated the client, 
the heavier the burden on the lawyer 
to demonstrate the procedural and 
substantive conscionability of the trans-
action. The lawyer’s relative sophis-
tication was mentioned by the court 
in Fair, but the fiduciary nature of the 
relationship itself creates a presumption 
of the lawyer’s relative sophistication. It 
is possible the court gave some added 
weight to the fact that the lawyer was a 
licensed real estate broker, but it is hard 
to imagine that the outcome would 
have been any different if the lawyer 
had not also been a licensed broker. The 
decision hinged on the lawyer’s status 
as lawyer, his lawyer-client relation-
ships with the individual client and the 
various entities they formed, and the 
lawyer’s failure to meet the burden of 
showing that the transactions were fair 
and reasonable and fully explained to 
the clients.
The obvious civil risks for a lawyer 
who goes into business with a client 
are the possible inability to enforce the 
transaction and the possible inability 
to be compensated for services to the 
business. There is also the danger that, 
when a lawyer obtains an ownership 
interest in a business, at least in part 
because the lawyer promises to pro-
vide legal services to the business, the 
lawyer might feel obligated to provide 
services outside the lawyer’s area of ex-
perience. The potential for malpractice 
liability is real in situations of this kind. 
A lawyer might think of himself only 
as one of the principals in the business, 
but he nevertheless owes all of the du-
ties that lawyers owe to clients. Related 
to this consideration are the ques-
tions of whether the lawyer will carry 
malpractice insurance and whether the 
insurance will protect the lawyer who 
is doing business with a client. It also 
is important to remember that some ju-
risdictions have malpractice insurance 
disclosure requirements. One example 
is California’s recently adopted Cal. 
Rule 3-410, which requires lawyers to 
tell their clients if they do not have mal-
practice coverage. The insurance issue 
easily could morph into a disciplinary 
issue if this disclosure is not made.
No two lawyer-client business trans-
actions are the same and instead create 
a wide spectrum of situations. At one 
extreme is a plain-vanilla transaction, 
the fairness of which is obvious and 
in which there may be little or nothing 
for the lawyer to explain to the client 
and little civil or disciplinary risk to the 
lawyer in that kind of situation. The 
further one moves across the spectrum, 
the more difficult it becomes for the 
lawyer to demonstrate, after the fact, 
that the transaction was fully explained 
and fair and reasonable to the client—
as happens when a lawyer goes into 
an ongoing real estate development or 
investment relationship with a client. 
This presents a real risk to the lawyer 
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                  and is something to be taken on—if at 
all—only with great caution.
Oasis West Realty, 
LLC v. Goldman
The second recent decision, in Oasis 
West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 
1115 (Cal. 2011), involved a lawyer who 
turned against the client on a project 
on which the lawyer previously had 
represented the client. In 2004, the cli-
ent retained the lawyer’s firm to obtain 
all the necessary approvals for a luxury 
hotel and condominium development 
in Beverly Hills. In 2006, shortly before 
the project went before the city council, 
the firm withdrew from the matter. 
Then, in 2008, after the council had 
approved the project, the firm’s lead 
lawyer on the deal joined a citizen’s 
group seeking to overturn the approv-
al, including soliciting signatures for a 
referendum petition. This conduct led 
the lawyer and his law firm to be sued 
for breach of contract and fiduciary 
duty and for professional negligence 
by the original client.
The defendants responded with a 
special motion to strike under Cali-
fornia’s “Anti-SLAPP” statute, which 
restricts lawsuits designed to discour-
age citizens from asserting their rights 
to petition the government. The trial 
court denied the motion, holding that 
the suit was based on claimed breaches 
of the lawyer’s duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality, but the court of ap-
peal reversed, ruling that the lawyer’s 
actions involved protected petitioning 
activity and that the client could not 
show that it was likely to prevail on its 
claims. The California Supreme Court 
then unanimously ruled in favor of the 
client. A presumption of confidential 
knowledge arose from the existence of 
the previous attorney-client relation-
ship, and the lawyer’s duties of loyalty 
and confidentiality continued even 
after representation of the client ended. 
Those duties were not confined—as 
the court of appeal had held—to cases 
involving subsequent representations 
or employment or the disclosure of 
confidential information; a breach can 
be damaging “even if the attorney is 
not working on behalf of a new client 
and even if none of the information 
is actually disclosed.” Id. at 1122. An 
attorney’s right to free speech does not 
include using confidential information 
to the detriment of a former client.
Does Oasis West v. Goldman advise 
lawyers whether they can go into 
business against rather than going 
into business with a former client? As 
a general principle, the duty of undi-
vided loyalty prevents a lawyer from 
being adverse to a current client on any 
matter, whether or not related to the 
subject of the current representation. 
The opinion in Oasis West is a reminder 
that the duty of loyalty generally ends 
with the termination of a lawyer-client 
relationship. What remains after the 
termination is a prohibition on the law-
yer’s being adverse to the former client 
on the subject of the former representa-
tion. This is the first California opin-
ion that applies the continuing duty 
of loyalty to a situation in which the 
lawyer’s conduct was not part of the 
representation of a new client. Before 
Oasis West, California law previously 
was thought to be generally consis-
tent with Model Rule 1.9(a), which 
prohibits a lawyer who has formerly 
represented a client in a certain matter 
from later representing another person 
“in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which that person’s interests 
are materially adverse to the interests 
of the former client unless the former 
client gives informed consent, con-
firmed in writing.”
Oasis West also is a reminder that a 
lawyer may neither use nor disclose the 
former client’s confidential information 
obtained by the lawyer as a result of 
the former lawyer-client relationship. 
The opinion suggests that a lawyer may 
engage in a business that is competitive 
with that of a former client, but not if in 
doing so the lawyer violates either the 
narrow continuing duty of loyalty or 
the continuing duty of confidentiality.
Can the lawyer join a firm that 
represents a client who is a competi-
tor of the former client? Yes, but with 
some important limits. First, without 
the consent of the former client, a 
lawyer cannot be adverse to a former 
client on a matter that is the same or 
substantially related to a matter on 
which the lawyer represented the for-
mer client. Model Rule 1.9(a). Second, 
this is true if the former representation 
was by the former firm, but not by the 
lawyer personally, but only if while 
the lawyer was at the former firm the 
lawyer obtained confidential informa-
tion of the former client. Model Rule 
1.9(b). Third, the lawyer may not use or 
disclose confidential information of the 
former client. Model Rule 1.9(c).
Must a lawyer advise a prior client 
about any adverse potential represen-
tation in the lawyer’s new situation? 
No. There is no general requirement 
that a lawyer who is leaving a law firm 
must give notice to or obtain consent 
from a former client when the lawyer’s 
new firm represents the former client’s 
competitor or is adverse to the former 
client. Consent from the former client, 
however, will be needed if the lawyer 
will be adverse to the former client on 
the subject of the former representa-
tion. Even if the individual lawyer will 
not be adverse to the former client, 
the lawyer must be aware that any 
information held by any firm lawyer 
is presumed to have been shared with 
all firm lawyers. This means that if 
the lawyer has pertinent confidential 
information, the lawyer’s new firm 
might be subject to disqualification 
even when the individual lawyer is 
not adverse to the former client. Ap-
plicable state law might permit the 
lawyer to institute an ethics screen to 
prevent disqualification of the firm 
when the migrating lawyer brings 
pertinent confidential information.
If a lawyer switches to another 
firm that presents some potential for 
conflicts, what steps might be taken to 
avoid trouble? The vital first step is to 
attempt to identify potential conflicts 
before the lawyer moves to another 
firm. The lawyer and the new firm 
must be aware of the conflict to be able 
to manage it.
Conclusion
The Fair and Oasis West cases remind 
lawyers to always consider ethical 
obligations when moving on to new 
endeavors. n
